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It is not fully understood why we cooperate with strangers on a
daily basis. In an increasingly global world, where interaction
networks and relationships between individuals are becoming
more complex, different hypotheses have been put forward to
explain the foundations of human cooperation on a large scale and
to account for the true motivations that are behind this phenom-
enon. In this context, population structure has been suggested to
foster cooperation in social dilemmas, but theoretical studies of
this mechanism have yielded contradictory results so far; addition-
ally, the issue lacks a proper experimental test in large systems.
We have performed the largest experiments to date with humans
playing a spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma on a lattice and a scale-free
network (1,229 subjects). We observed that the level of coopera-
tion reached in both networks is the same, comparable with the
level of cooperation of smaller networks or unstructured popula-
tions. We have also found that subjects respond to the coopera-
tion that they observe in a reciprocal manner, being more likely to
cooperate if, in the previous round, many of their neighbors and
themselves did so, which implies that humans do not consider
neighbors’ payoffs when making their decisions in this dilemma
but only their actions. Our results, which are in agreement with
recent theoretical predictions based on this behavioral rule, sug-
gest that population structure has little relevance as a cooperation
promoter or inhibitor among humans.
evolutionary game dynamics | network reciprocity |
conditional cooperation
The strong cooperative attitude of humans defies the paradigmof Homo economicus and poses an evolutionary conundrum
(1, 2). This conundrum is because many of our interactions can
be framed as Prisoner’s Dilemmas (3–5) or Public Goods Games
(6), famous for bringing about a tragedy of the commons (7).
Several mechanisms have been suggested as putative explan-
ations of cooperative behavior (8), among which the existence of
an underlying network of contacts constraining who one can
interact with has received very much attention. This mechanism
was first proposed in the work by Nowak and May (9), where
simulations on a square lattice with agents that imitate the be-
havior of their neighbor with the highest payoff showed high
levels of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The ensuing
two decades have witnessed a wealth of theoretical studies that
have concluded that this so-called network reciprocity (8) is,
indeed, possible under a variety of circumstances, but in many
other contexts, networks do not promote—or they even inhibit—
cooperation (10, 11). The effect of regular and homogeneous
networks on cooperation is very sensitive to the details of the
model (e.g., dynamics and clustering), whereas theoretical results
and simulations indicate that heterogeneous networks should be
particularly efficient in fostering cooperation in social dilemmas
(11–13). A natural way to shed some light on these partially
contradictory results would be to test experimentally the pre-
dictions of the different models. Such tests are currently lacking
(14), because the few available experimental works only deal—
with some exception (15)—with very small networks (16–18).
Interestingly, the only theoretical result (19) that takes into
account the behavioral information extracted from experiments
predicts that neither homogeneous nor heterogeneous networks
would influence the cooperative behavior in the Prisoner’s Di-
lemma (i.e., the observed cooperation level should be the same
as if every player interacted with every other player).
Here, we close the cycle by testing the above theoretical pre-
dictions (19) and contributing to the current debate on the ex-
istence and effects of network reciprocity by performing
experiments on large samples of structured populations of indi-
viduals who interact through a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game.
Specifically, we have designed a setup in which 1,229 human
subjects were placed in either a square lattice or a scale-free
network, and for more than 50 rounds, they played a 2 × 2
multiplayer PD game with each of their k neighbors, taking only
one action [either to cooperate (C) or defect (D)—the action
being the same against all opponents]. The experiment was si-
multaneously carried out on two different virtual networks: a
25 × 25 lattice with k = 4 and periodic boundary conditions (625
subjects) and a heterogeneous network with a fat-tailed degree
distribution (604 subjects; the number of neighbors varied be-
tween k = 2 and k = 16). Fig. 1 depicts a snapshot of a visual
representation of the experiment as well as the two networks;
more details on the experimental setup as well as a summary of
the actions of the subjects during the experiment can be found in
SI Materials and Methods and SI Results and Discussion. Subjects
played a repeated (weak) PD with all their neighbors for an ini-
tially undetermined number of rounds. Payoffs of the PD were set
to be 7 Experimental Currency Units (ECUs) for mutual coop-
eration, 10 ECUs for a defector facing a cooperator, and 0 ECUs
for any player facing a defector (weak PD) (9). We note that this
choice of payoffs is like the experiment in the work by Grujic
et al. (15) on a smaller regular lattice (Fig. 1), and therefore,
cooperation should reach a high level according to the available
simulations (9, 11–13). The size of each network was large
enough, and therefore, clusters of cooperators could form (the
underlying mechanism by which cooperators may thrive) (20, 21).
On this general setup, we carried out two treatments, which we
will refer to as experiment and control. In the experiment, sub-
jects remained at the same positions in the network with the same
neighbors throughout all of the rounds played. In the control
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treatment, we removed the effect of the network by shuffling the
neighbors of each subject in every round. Therefore, in this phase,
the players were always connected to the same number of neigh-
bors, but these neighbors changed from round to round. On the
screen, subjects saw the actions and normalized payoffs of their
neighbors from the previous round, who in the control treatment,
were different from their current neighbors with high probability
(SI Materials and Methods and SI Results and Discussion). All
treatments of the experiment were carried out in sequence with
the same subjects. Players were also fully informed of the dif-
ferent setups that they were going to run. The number of rounds
in each treatment was randomly chosen between 50 and 70 to
avoid subjects knowing in advance when it was going to finish,
resulting in 51 and 59 rounds for the experimental and control
treatments, respectively. Full details are provided in SI Materials
and Methods and SI Results and Discussion.
Results and Discussion
Fig. 2 A and B shows the fraction of cooperative actions, c, in
each round for the two networks and both treatments. The first
feature worth noticing in Fig. 2 is that, in the experiment phase,
the level of cooperation in either network quickly drops from
initial values around 60% to values around 40% and finally settles
at a slower pace around 30%, much lower than theoretical models
A B C
Fig. 1. Players in the experiment were sitting in different physical locations but played in two virtual networks. A is a snapshot at round 10 of a graphic
animation illustrating the activity during the experiment (SI Results and Discussion). On a map of Aragón, the image displays small buildings representing the
schools. Arrows (green for cooperate and red for defect) represent actual actions taken by players. They travel to the school, where their randomly assigned
neighbors were sitting. Buildings are colored green and red, proportional to the respective number of cooperative and defective actions taken by the subjects
in that school. The height of the yellow column on top of each building is proportional to the school’s accumulated payoffs. B and C show snapshots of the
two networks at that same round along with their degree distributions (in the case of the heterogeneous network, both the theoretical distribution and the
actual realization corresponding to the network of the experiment are represented). Colors indicate the corresponding player’s action (green, cooperate; red,
defect). The size of a node is proportional to its degree.
A C
B D
Fig. 2. The level of cooperation declines and is independent of the network of contacts. Fraction of cooperative actions (level of cooperation) per round
during the experiment (A) and the control (B) for both networks and histograms of cooperative actions in the lattice (C) and the heterogeneous network (D).
The histograms (C and D) show the number of subjects ranked according to the fraction of cooperative actions that they perform along the experiment in the
two networks. A Kolmogorov–Smirnov test shows that the distributions are statistically indistinguishable (SI Results and Discussion). They illustrate the high
heterogeneity in subjects’ behavior—their levels of cooperation ranging from nearly zero to almost one in a practically continuous distribution. The cor-
responding histograms for the control (Fig. S4) show that a sizable group of subjects lowered their levels of cooperation, hence becoming mostly defectors.
Actually, the decline in the level of cooperation observed in the experiment (A and B) can be explained as a constant flow of subjects to more defective
strategies (evidence supporting this hypothesis in Figs. S5 and S6).
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predict (9–11). This finding is especially remarkable for the
heterogeneous network, on which no previous results are avail-
able, and it is in stark contrast with the predictions that this kind
of networks should be particularly efficient in promoting co-
operation (11–13). In the control, the initial level of cooperation
is already at these low values. This behavior is consistent with
previous findings in experiments with smaller lattices (15, 18) as
well as unstructured populations (22, 23). Regarding the slow
decay undergone by these curves after the first quick drop in
the level of cooperation, we believe that this finding is associated
with a process of learning (see below). However, the most re-
markable result that Fig. 2 provides is that, quite unexpectedly, the
network does not have any influence in the evolution of the level of
cooperation. In fact, both curves are nearly identical—the slightly
lower values obtained for the lattice are likely to arise from the
small difference in the initial level of cooperation—despite the very
different nature of the networks of contacts between the players.
The experimental result that we have just reported is in very
good agreement with the theoretical prediction in ref. 19. This
finding prompts us to investigate in detail the players’ behavior,
because the reason why this prediction was different from earlier
ones is the use of the update rule observed in ref. 15. The dis-
tributions of subjects by their individual cooperation levels (av-
eraged over the whole experiment) depicted in Fig. 2 C and D
show some heterogeneity of behavior: a few subjects have a high
level of cooperation (above 70%), and a sizable fraction coop-
erated in less than 20% of the rounds, whereas the bulk of
subjects have intermediate levels of cooperation. Importantly,
the comparison of these distributions of actions, which turns out
to be statistically indistinguishable (Kolmogorov–Smirnov test
data in Table S1), provides additional evidence that the behavior
observed in the two networks is the same. This finding, along with
the identical behavior of the cooperation level, suggests that sub-
jects use the same strategies in the lattice and the heterogeneous
network, regardless of the fact that, in the latter, the number of
neighbors of each individual is heterogeneously distributed.
After considering the aggregate distribution of actions, let us
now look for deeper insights on the individual behaviors. As in
previous experiments on smaller lattices (15, 18) or unstructured
populations (22, 23), our results are compatible with a co-
existence of at least three basic strategies: cooperators (players
who cooperate with a high probability regardless of the context),
defectors (players who defect with a high probability regardless
of the context), and moody conditional cooperators (15) (players
whose action depends on their previous action as well as the level
of cooperation in their neighborhood). A search for moody
conditional cooperation shows the results depicted in Fig. 3. Fig.
3 A and B shows the fraction of cooperative actions occurred
after a cooperation/defection as a function of the level of co-
operation in the neighborhood. The plots are the fingerprint of
moody conditional cooperation: players are more prone to co-
operate the more their neighbors cooperate if they cooperated
than if they defected. Furthermore, Fig. 3 also supports the
striking finding that the strategic behavior of subjects is re-
markably similar whether they are playing on the lattice (Fig. 3A)
or the heterogeneous network (Fig. 3B). However, Fig. 3 C and
D shows that the next action of a subject cannot be predicted
knowing the largest payoff difference that he/she sees in the
neighborhood, thus confirming that subjects did not use payoff
differences as a guidance to update their actions.
Fig. 4 provides additional evidence of the significance of the
moody conditional cooperation by means of a nonparametric
bootstrap check. The series of actions taken by every individual is
randomly reassigned to other positions in the lattice or the
network, and the probability of cooperation is recomputed.
This action is done 106 times, and the results show that the two
probabilities become independent of the context. Of course, such
a reshuffling will not change the dependence on the player’s own
previous action, because the order of the actions is not altered;
consequently, there are still two distinct lines corresponding to
the probability of cooperation after cooperation or defection, but
the dependence on the number of cooperators in the previous
round is fully removed.
The existence of (almost pure) cooperators and defectors
aside from moody conditional cooperators can be further sup-
ported through a comparison with the same histograms but for
the control condition (Fig. S4), because for the latter, a larger
number of subjects are in the region that would correspond to
defectors. This finding can be interpreted as an indication that a
fraction of (probably) moody conditional cooperators changed to
a defective strategy, given that retaliation is ineffective in the
control condition. Furthermore, performing running averages of
the levels of cooperation during the experiment condition (Figs.
S5 and S6) shows that the number of subjects with levels of co-
operation that are below a given threshold increases with time—
irrespective of the precise value of the threshold. Not only does
this finding give support to the existence of this kind of players,
but it is consistent with a continuous (albeit small) flow of players
who change from moody conditional cooperation to defection—
a behavior that could be understood as a generalized form of a
grim strategy. Notice that this flow can account for the slow
decay observed all along the run of the experiment and control
observed in Fig. 2 A and B.
Finally, another important point that our experiment addresses
to some extent is the dependence of the actions on the connec-
tivity of the participants for the heterogeneous network. The
results are displayed in Fig. 5, where we represent the average
cooperation level c as a function of the connectivity of the players
B
C
A
D
Fig. 3. Players’ behavior depends both on the level of cooperation in the
neighborhood and their previous action. Frequency of cooperative actions
after a cooperative/defective action conditioned to the context (fraction of
cooperative actions in the neighborhood in the previous round) observed in
the lattice (A) and the heterogeneous network (B). Details of the linear fits
and comparison with randomizations to prove statistical significance can be
found in Table S2 and SI Results and Discussion. The plots show that there is
a relevant dependence on the context for subjects who cooperated in the
previous round (i.e., were in a cooperative mood): the cooperation proba-
bility increased with the fraction of cooperative neighbors, similar to the
conditional cooperators found in the work by Fischbacher et al. (24). How-
ever, after having defected, this dependence is less clear, and if anything, it
suggest an exploiting behavior—subjects who defected are less prone to
cooperate the more cooperation that they find. C and D show how subjects
who cooperated or defected are distributed according to the largest payoff-
per-link difference in their neighborhoods between the two actions. These
plots reveal that a player’s decision to cooperate or defect was independent
of the payoffs per link that they observed (information that was explicitly
provided during the experiment).
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k for both treatments: experiment and control. As can be seen
from the plots, there might be some trend to lower levels of
cooperation with increasing degree for small connectivities,
particularly in the control (the levels for the first three values of
the degree in the experiment are not statistically different).
However, looking at Fig. 5 as a whole, it becomes clear that there
does not seem to be any statistically significant trend. It has to be
borne in mind that, in this type of network, the number of hubs
or large-degree nodes is intrinsically small, and therefore, the
statistics for them are not very accurate (notice the size of the
error bars). Going beyond these results would require much
larger networks (which would still have the same problem for
their higher-degree nodes). Additionally, Fig. 5, Lower shows the
frequency of cooperative actions of nodes with degree k after
playing as C or D with respect to the fraction of their neighbors
that cooperated in the previous round. The results are clear evi-
dence that moody conditional cooperation is, indeed, the general
behavior, even if one disaggregates the data in terms of their
degree. As we have already stated above for the total level of
cooperation, for higher degrees, the statistics are poorer, and
the analysis does not lead to such clear-cut results.
Conclusions
To sum up, we have performed a large-scale experimental test of
the hypothesis of network reciprocity (i.e., that the existence of
a structure in the population may affect cooperation in social
dilemmas). Our experiment shows that, when it comes to human
behavior, the existence of an underlying network of contacts does
not seem to have any influence in the global outcome. We want
to stress that this conclusion applies only to human cooperation,
and network reciprocity may still be relevant in other contexts
(e.g., microbiology) (25). Players seem to act by responding to
the level of cooperation in their neighborhood, and this finding
renders the network irrelevant. In addition, players behave in
a moody manner, being significantly less likely to cooperate after
a defection of their own. The levels of cooperation attained in a
regular lattice and a highly heterogeneous network (hitherto
thought to be a cooperation enhancer) are indistinguishable, and
the responsive behavior of subjects seems to be independent of
the number of neighbors that they have or the payoff differences
that they observe. The results are in full agreement with the
theoretical prediction in ref. 19; the fact that the key hypothesis
in that model is that people behave in the way that we have just
described provides additional support to our finding of moody
conditional cooperation in networked PDs.
Our results have implications for policy-making when co-
operation is a desired behavior. Although additional experiments
with other social dilemmas still need to assess the range of ap-
plicability of our conclusions, the present study suggests that
imposing a network structure might be a sterile effort. It should
be noted, however, that this caveat does not imply that net-
working is useless to achieve cooperation—results would prob-
ably be very different if the network is allowed to be formed by
the subjects as part of the game. Recent experiments on groups
of up to 20 people (26, 27) strongly suggest this theory, but to the
best of our knowledge, no large-scale experiments have been
carried out to test this issue. However, the theoretical work in
ref. 19 does not predict the slow decay of the cooperation level
observed in the experiments, which we have conjectured arises
from moody conditional cooperators becoming defectors in a
generalized grim behavior. Such a change in the percentage of
players using different strategies is not included in the theoretical
model, and therefore, a next step would require accounting for
such changes and if possible, justifying them within an evolu-
tionary framework. Finally, given that, in our setup, players have
to play the same action with all their neighbors, it is clear that
our results should be related to Public Goods experiments. In
fact, conditional cooperation was first observed in that context
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Fig. 4. Null hypothesis statistical significance test. Probability of cooperat-
ing after playing C or D, conditioned to the context (fraction of cooperative
actions in the neighborhood in the previous round), averaged over 106
random shuffling of players. A corresponds to the experimental treatment in
the lattice, B corresponds to the same treatment for the heterogeneous
network, C corresponds to the control phase in the lattice, and D corre-
sponds to the same control treatment for the heterogeneous network. The
results show that there is no dependence on the context and hence, that the
results of Fig. 3 A and B are statistically relevant. The anomalous variance (or
even absence of data) observed at a fraction of Cs in the neighborhood close
to 0.9 is not a relevant feature of the experimental results but a consequence
of the very low probability of having events contributing to that bin of the
histogram in the heterogeneous network. This anomaly can also be noticed
in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 5. Dependence of the strategies on the connectivity. Upper shows the
cooperation level c as a function of the connectivity ki in the heterogeneous
network averaged over all rounds of the experiment (Upper Left) and the
control (Upper Right) of the experiment. In Lower, we plot the frequency of
cooperative actions of players with degree as indicated after they have
cooperated or defected as a function of the fraction of cooperative actions
in their neighborhood during the previous round; we also plot the experi-
ment treatment in the heterogeneous network. Statistics are restricted to
nodes of connectivity: k = 2 (Lower Left), k = 3 (Lower Center), and k = 4
(Lower Right).
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(24). Our findings suggest that the moody version that we have
found can also arise in Public Goods games. If that is the case, it
is likely that network reciprocity does not apply to Public Goods
games on networks. Hopefully, our experiment will encourage
additional research in all these directions.
Materials and Methods
The experiment was carried out with 1,229 volunteers chosen among last
year’s high school students (17–18 y old) of 42 different high schools located
throughout the geography of the Autonomous Region of Aragón, Spain. All
of the students played through a web interface specifically created for the
experiment (see Figs. S1–S3 and SI Materials and Methods) that was acces-
sible through the computers available in the computer rooms of their re-
spective schools. At least one teacher supervised the experiment in each
computer room (which at most, had a maximum capacity of 20 students),
preventing any interaction among the students. To further guarantee that
potential interactions among students seating next to each other in the class
did not influence the results of the experiment, the assignment of players to
the different topologies was completely random. The colors used to code
the two available actions of the game were also selected randomly, also
decreasing the likelihood that neighboring participants could influence each
other. All participants went through a tutorial (included in SI Materials and
Methods) on the screen, including questions to check their understanding of
the game. When everybody had gone through the tutorial, the experiment
began, lasting for approximately 1 h. The experiment assumed synchronous
play; thus, we had to make sure that every round ended in a certain amount
of time. This playing time was set to 20 s. At the end of the experiments,
volunteers were presented a small questionnaire to fill in. Immediately after,
all participants received their earnings and their show-up fee. Total earnings
in the experiment ranged from 2.49 to 40.48 Euros.
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